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Abstract
This paper discusses the use of addenda for the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) to the 
Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), located at the Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and 
processes at the RWMC that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the 
DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions 
(USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update.
INTRODUCTION
During the last several years, the RWMC has had several projects that required completion in 
accordance with agreements with the State of Idaho and the Department of Energy for the 
removal or packaging of transuranic waste.  Two of these projects were the 3100 Cubic Meter 
Project and the Glovebox Excavator Method Project. To facilitate the operation of these projects, 
addenda to DSAs were used for the safety documents.  In addition, for the Glovebox Excavator 
Method Project, an addendum to the RWMC technical safety requirements document was also 
developed.
3100 Cubic Meter Project 
The 3100 Cubic Meter Project required the RWMC to characterize and certify 3100 m3 of 
transuranic waste for shipment from the INEEL to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 
New Mexico. This project was completed in 2002, beating all the contract obligations.  In 
support of operations, there were three types of safety documents generated, including:  (1) 
positive “New Information/Discovery” USQ determinations and resolutions, (2) new facility 
processes with positive USQ determinations, and (3) new or existing facility descriptions with 
negative USQ determinations. Positive USQ determinations required DOE approval of the 
revised safety basis or the resolution plan, whereas negative USQ determinations were contractor 
approved, and would be DOE approved at the next annual update.  In order to meet the 
aggressive project schedule, revisions to the facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) were required 
in very short timeframes, typically 6 to 12 weeks. SAR addenda were used to describe these new 
processes and to resolve any positive USQ determinations. An abbreviated DOE-STD-3009 
format was followed, with the addenda focusing mainly on the new process. This typically 
resulted in a SAR addendum containing DOE-STD-3009 Chapter 2, “Facility Description,” 
Chapter 3, “Hazard and Accident Analysis,” Chapter 4, “Safety Structures, Systems, and 
Components,” and Chapter 5, “Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements.” Addendum 
material was specific to the process and referenced the main body of the SAR.  For example, 
Chapter 2, “Facility Description,” described only the new process and referenced the main body 
of the SAR for facilitywide descriptions. 
Addenda could be prepared, attached to the main bodies of the SARs, and approved by DOE 
much faster than complete SAR revisions. By completing a SAR addendum, the issue of 
incorporating annual update information and other minor facility changes could be kept separate 
from the addendum, and thus avoid confusion or slowdown of the review process down. The 
addendum also made the review process easier, because the reviewer only needed to focus on a 
relatively small addendum, specific to individual processes, rather than on the entire SAR. 
Upon completion of the 3100 Cubic Meter Project at the INEEL, many of the processes were 
decommissioned. The use of addenda simplified the SAR updates, because the addenda for 
retired processes could simply be removed. Other addenda could be incorporated into the main 
body of the SAR at a more leisurely pace during the annual update process. 
If an addendum is used, annual updates to the SAR are still required per Title 10 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Subpart B.  At the time of the annual update, an evaluation should 
be performed to determine if the addendum should be (1) incorporated into the main safety 
analysis document, (2) left as is, or (3) deleted (if the activity has been completed). 
Glovebox Excavator Method Project 
The Glovebox Excavator Method Project will retrieve at least 75 yd3 of buried transuranic waste 
from the OU 7-10 pit located in the Subsurface Disposal Area at the RWMC.  The removed 
waste will be stored above ground at the RWMC, pending disposal at the WIPP.  This project 
was determined to be a major modification to the RWMC operation that resulted in a preliminary 
documented safety analysis.  During the development of the DSA for the Glovebox Excavator 
Method Project, the DSA that would comply with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B for the RWMC was 
being developed.  The schedule for the Glovebox Excavator Method Project was such that 
incorporation of the safety analysis into the upgraded DSA was not feasible.  The Glovebox 
Excavator Method Project required a new DSA to support a DOE operational readiness review in 
September 2003.  The approval of the upgraded RWMC DSA was being delayed due to the 
deactivation of several facility operations.  Therefore, it was determined that a DSA addendum 
would be produced to support the Glovebox Excavator Method Project.  This addendum 
followed the 17-chapter format of  DOE-STD-3009.  It also referenced the RWMC DSA, where 
applicable.  In addition, because the RWMC TSRs were also being upgraded, a TSR addendum 
was also developed. 
The Glovebox Excavator Method Project is a one-month operation.  At the end of the operation, 
the facility will begin deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning (DD&D) activities.  
These activities were also included in the Glovebox Excavator Method Project DSA to support 
the necessary safety analysis activities.  Upon completion of the Glovebox Excavator Method 
Project at the INEEL, it is anticipated that the DSA addendum will be deleted, using the USQ 
process.  Then during the annual update, the TSRs will be removed. 
Conclusion
SAR addenda can be useful tools for the safety analyst. There are times when a DSA addendum 
is more cost effective and time efficient than revising the DSA. A DSA addendum should be 
considered when: 
• The operation is short-lived or a one-time-only operation 
• The use of an addendum makes the safety analysis easier to understand 
• The preparation of an addendum is the most cost- and schedule-effective method. 
